Case Summaries

Injury & Tort Law

[02/03] Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Roberts
In a suit brought by an insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to indemnify its insured for no more than 40 percent of a state court judgment because it had covered its insured for no more than 40 percent of the time in which the state court plaintiff was exposed to lead poisoning, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part, where it was correct in allocating the insurer's liability using the pro-rata time on-the-risk, and its decision to use the plaintiff's date of birth as the starting point for the period in which she was exposed to lead poisoning was sound; and 2) reversed in part, where the district court erred in holding the insurer liable for 24 months of coverage rather than 22, since under the insurance contract, coverage ended when the property was sold.

[02/02] Lore v. City of Syracuse
In a case alleging illegal retaliation against a city police officer under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL) because of her complaints of gender discrimination, the district court's judgment is: 1) affirmed in part where the city's arguments regarding the availability of reputation damages, evidentiary and instructional errors, and excessive damages for emotional distress presented no basis for disturbing the judgment; and 2) vacated in part where there was merit in plaintiff's contentions regarding the liability of the city's corporation counsel, and the district court erred in dismissing her principal gender discrimination claims under the HRL on the basis that she had suffered no materially adverse employment action.

[02/01] Maxton v. Western States Metals
In a suit alleging negligence and strict liability causes of action based on personal injuries as a result of working with metal products manufactured by the defendants and supplied to the plaintiff's employer, the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants on demurrers is affirmed, where: 1) the metal products involved were not inherently dangerous, and no other circumstances justified imposing liability on the defendants for the plaintiff's injuries under the component parts doctrine; 2) the plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing there was a reasonable possibility that the deficiencies in the complaint could be cured by amendment.

[01/30] Sennett v. US
In a suit by a photojournalist seeking money damages against the federal government for FBI agents' alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) stemming from a search of her apartment, the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the United States is affirmed, where: 1) the facts as alleged showed that the officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was involved in criminal activity; and 2) the search of her home related to the investigation of that activity, so that the "suspect exception" to the PPA applied.

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Banking Law

[02/01] GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a suit alleging breach of lease agreements that the defendant bank assumed after it purchased a failed bank's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to the terms of a written purchase and assumption agreement, the district court's grant of the bank's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where under federal common law, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under the agreement because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

[01/24] TIFD III-E, Inc. v. US
In a suit by a taxpayer partner challenging IRS notices of adjustment reallocating a large percentage of the partnership's income for the years 1993 to 1998 to the taxpayer away from two Dutch banks that had purchased an interest in the partnership, and imposing a penalty for underpayment, the district court's judgment in favor of the taxpayer is reversed, where: 1) the banks' interest was not a capital interest for purposes of qualifying them as partners within the meaning of IRC section 704(e)(1); and 2) the taxpayer failed to point to substantial authority supporting its position, so that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

[01/06] Vegas Diamond Properties, LLC v. FDIC
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court dissolving a Temporary Restraining Order on the ground that the anti-injunction provision of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act precluded it from enjoining the FDIC from conducting a trustee's sale of certain real properties, appeal is dismissed as moot where the subject properties were sold prior to appeal.

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Commercial Law

[02/01] In re American Express Merchants' Litigation
In a class action asserting Sherman Act claims, brought against a charge card issuer whose card acceptance agreement purported to preclude a merchant from bringing a class action lawsuit, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismissal of the case is reversed, where the cost of plaintiffs' individually arbitrating their dispute with the defendant would be prohibitive, effectively depriving them of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws, and thus the class action waiver in the arbitration provision was unenforceable.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/24] Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc.
In a putative class action against a men's clothing retailer alleging that its printing of “EXPIRY: 04/##” on a credit card receipt willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)'s prohibition against printing the expiration date of the a credit card upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where: 1) FACTA prohibits a merchant from printing expiration date information on a receipt provided to the consumer, even if the year is redacted; but 2) the defendant's interpretation of FACTA, although erroneous, was at least objectively reasonable, and thus there was no "willful" violation that could support a claim.

[01/24] Mabey Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch
In a suit by a corporation engaged in the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for construction projects, seeking a declaration that the Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act, as interpreted and enforced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), is unconstitutional, and requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting the use of the company's temporary bridges on its projects, the district court's grant of summary judgment against the company on all its claims is affirmed, where: 1) the state Steel Act was not preempted by the federal Buy America Act and related federal regulations; 2) the Steel Act is not unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause; 3) PennDOT's actions did not violate the Contract Clause; and 4) PennDOT's application of the Steel Act did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

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Professional Malpractice

[12/08] Creekmore v. Maryview Hospital
Medical malpractice judgment is affirmed where the plaintiff's expert witness is found to be qualified to testify as to the standard of care under state law because he performs the same procedure in the same context at issue.

[11/15] Khodayari v. Mashburn
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court dismissing appellant's tort complaint against his former counsel in postconviction proceedings, judgment is affirmed where the complaints sounds in legal malpractice such that appellant's failure to show actual innocence of the concerned probation violations and to obtain post-violation exoneration of those violations support the trial court's dismissal.

[10/20] Simon v. Usher
In an appeal from a judgment of the appellate division reversing the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to change venue in a medical malpractice action, judgment is reversed where the five-day extension under CPLR 2103(b)(2) applies to the 15-day time period prescribed by CPLR 511(b) when a defendant serves its demand for change of venue by mail.

[10/18] Smith v. Cimmet
In an appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing a legal malpractice action brought by a successive estate representative on the ground that the representative lacked standing because he was never a client of the defendant-attorneys, judgment is reversed where: 1) an Oregon representative lacks capacity to sue in California because his authority does not extend beyond Oregon but may seek relief through an ancillary appointment by the California courts; and 2) under both California and Oregon statutory law, plaintiff has standing to sue attorneys who were retained by his predecessor to act on the estate's behalf.

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Property Law & Real Estate

[01/27] Matter of Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings involving the question whether the debtor was subject to the single asset real estate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the district court's holding that the single asset real estate provisions applied is affirmed, where: 1) the debtor, which existed solely to operate a 92-unit apartment complex, could be characterized as a single asset real estate debtor under the Bankruptcy Code; 2) the plain language of the Code gives no basis for a "whole business enterprise" exception to single asset real estate debtor status that would allow the court to consider parent corporation and sister subsidiaries; and 3) the district court did not err in its approach to granting relief from the automatic stay by leaving questions about whether the debtor timely took timely corrective action to the bankruptcy court in the first instance.

[01/25] Otay Mesa Property, L.P. v. US
On appeal from a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims awarding plaintiffs $3,043,051, plus interest, for the temporary taking of a blanket easement over five parcels of land and limiting the government's liability to the taking of an easement over those five parcels and limiting the period of the taking to April of 1999 to October of 2008, the judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part, where: 1) the Claims Court erred when it concluded that the government's taking of the easement was a temporary rather than a permanent physical taking, resulting in an erroneous calculation of the plaintiffs' damages; and 2) the Claims Court did not err in limiting the government's liability.

[01/25] General Development Co., L.P. v. City of Santa Maria
On appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of the City of Santa Maria after the trial court ruled that a developer's petition for writ of mandate was time barred by Government Code section 65009 for failure to timely challenge the denial of a zone change, judgment is affirmed, where the trial court did not err in ruling that City's denial of the developer's rezoning application was a "decision of a legislative body to adopt or amend a zoning ordinance" within the meaning of section 65009.

[01/20] Center for Sierra Nevada Conservation v. County of El Dorado
In a case arising from the County of El Dorado's adoption of an oak woodland management plan and mitigation fee program without an environmental impact report (EIR), the district court's judgment in favor of the county is reversed, where: 1) the county could not rely on an earlier program EIR for its conclusion that the adoption of the plan and fee program would have no greater adverse environmental effect than that already anticipated in the program EIR, and its adoption of a negative declaration; and 2) the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required a tiered EIR to be conducted prior to the county's adoption of the plan and fee program.

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